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Introduction 
 
 Long ago Wesley Salmon (1963, p. 67) noticed a connection between argumentum ad 
hominem and authority arguments. Each type takes a feature of the person presenting the 
argument as relevant to the acceptance, or not, of its conclusion. Ad hominem arguments 
are supposed to work by connecting something negative about the arguer with the 
argument; authority arguments are supposed to work the other way – they are reverse ad 
hominem arguments, said Salmon. This interplay between these argument types is 
important, for it suggests an appropriate way of responding to each. I will be focusing 
here on a way an ad hominem strategy may be used to respond to arguments from 
authority. These arguments contain a premise with an appeal to an expert, or authoritative 
person, in order to add persuasive force or cognitive weight to a putative conclusion. In 
this respect, the audience to such an argument is invited to believe its conclusion partly on 
the basis that some person (the authority) also believes, asserts, or holds it. Given 
Salmon’s observation, rebutting an argument from authority, qua authority, makes ad 
hominem tactics not only permissible but sensible, in order to ‘fight fire with fire’. 
 
 Many writers distinguish between the sub variants of argumentum ad hominem, for 
example, the abusive, bias, circumstantial, guilt by association, poisoning the well, and tu 
quoque, versions. The distinctions between these – which are often highly contested and 
loose – nevertheless help to mark out a way of evaluating each type. I will argue that tu 
quoque, as conceived more traditionally than the standard ‘You too’ version, typically 
serves as a very effective tool to be using against an authority argument. For example, 
whereas the circumstantial ad hominem may claim a person’s situation taints their 
reasoning, and so raises suspicions about their motives, the version of tu quoque of 
interest here, points out that the opponent now makes a claim she disowns elsewhere. Bad 
motives are one thing, but inconsistency is a more serious charge, and when it cannot be 
satisfactorily explained away, it leaves an audience not merely suspicious of a potential 
bias (as occurs in the circumstantial variant), but genuinely puzzled about a fellow 
conversationalist’s dialectical status or intent. In this sense tu quoque arguments lay claim 
to the most robust of the ad hominem strategies. 
 
 The tu quoque strategy, then, can be especially effective against authority arguments 
because experts who contradict themselves fail the high epistemic standards presupposed 
by such arguments. In teasing out the proper relation between tu quoque and authority, I 
will note a distinction between what I call arguments from authority and arguments with 
authority. In the former an interlocutor makes appeals to other experts and authorities, 
whereas in the latter the case is made from one’s own expertise or authority. Tu quoque, 
in a sense to be explained, is best thought to target the latter. 
 
 In setting up the discussion I describe a non standard conception of the tu quoque, and 
provide a valid schematic form.1 I underscore the importance in tu quoque of 
distinguishing apparent inconsistency from real inconsistency where the former turns out 
better explained by an opponent’s weakness of will or self-deception. I finish with a range 
of examples that depict the tu quoque strategy in practice, and then draw some more 
 general conclusions from these examples particularly in relation to the concept of 
hypocrisy. 
  
 A final preliminary is that the position set out here in relation to authority arguments 
is relatively standard, but the slightly non standard interpretation of tu quoque is arguably 
merely a terminological departure from the recognised orthodoxy.2 My purpose, however, 
is to describe, and give reasons for, what I take are plausible accounts of these concepts, 
and to study what connects them. A more fundamental purpose is recognition and 
understanding of this aspect of informal logic dynamics and their fit with public 
discourse. It seems particularly important to be clear about these questions at a time when 
public and political discourse, at least in the west, has reached such a low point.3  
 
Tu quoque 
 
 Textbook treatments of ad hominem usually regard its various forms as exhibiting 
fallacies of relevance. Such treatment is sometimes understandable in a teaching context 
in which deductive validity is fresh in the minds of students who have just been taught 
that a necessary condition of rational success for this salient argument form must focus on 
what the premises say (an internal aspect), and so, as suggested by this, not who says 
them. In these treatments, ad hominem arguments are swiftly dismissed as fallacious 
given the irrelevance of the reasoner to those internal aspects. In contrast to this, the 
approach of Eemeren and Grootendorst known as pragma-dialectics, situates argument in 
its conversational context.4 This approach allows an intelligible sense in which both 
internal and external aspects of argumentation are taken as relevant in the evaluation of an 
argument’s rational success. Further, I make the Grice-like idealizing assumption of 
cooperation – sometimes called, unfortunately in my view, the ‘Goody Two-Shoes 
Model’ – so that our motivation in pursuing disputation aims honestly at settling disputes 
rather than stone-walling, obfuscating, distracting, and so on.5 In this regard, somewhat 
ironically, the tactic of the traditional ad hominem is to legitimately pin down an 
opponent with respect to their acceptance now of a proposition P, where the conditions 
leading to that acceptance are themselves relevant to the establishment now of P.6  
 
 The sense in which some ad hominem strategies have legitimate relevance 
dialectically can be traced to what I have been calling the traditional conception or 
Lockean View (see Woods and Walton, 1989, p. 55). Locke cited four sorts of argument 
within debate used on an opponent to ‘prevail on their assent’ and ‘silence their 
opposition’, the third of these being to ‘press a man with consequences drawn from his 
own principles or concessions’ (1690/1984, p. 423). In fact many authors trace the roots 
of the traditional conception back to Aristotle who distinguished between a ‘proof relative 
to the person’ and absolute proofs. Later conceptions of interest can be found in Galileo, 
Schopenhauer, Whately (1836), and De Morgan (1847).7 Whately in particular comes 
close to an understanding of the traditional tu quoque ad hominem I will consider as 
expressing critical dissatisfaction with an opponent for asserting a view they apparently 
oppose elsewhere. In Elements of Logic, he writes: 
 
It appears then (to speak rather more technically) that in the “argumentum ad 
hominem” the conclusion which actually is established, is not the absolute and 
general one in question, but relative and particular; viz. not that “such and such is the 
fact,” but that “this man is bound to admit it, in conformity to his principles of 
Reasoning, or in consistency with his own conduct, situation, …” (pp. 237-38). 
 
 Whately introduces the section with the comment that argumentum ad hominem, inter 
alia, should not be regarded as universally fallacious, this notion resting on ‘fair use’. 
Thus, it would not be fallacious as a tactic against someone who would not ‘yield to fair 
general argument’, or in not acknowledging the presence of non conformity or 
inconsistency in their position, to assign that failure ‘its due weight’. In addition, the 
tactic must be deployed ‘plainly’ and ‘avowedly’, and without substituting the ‘triumph’ 
of showing a fault in your opponent with ‘having established your proposition absolutely 
and universally’. To do that would make you ‘…guilty of a Fallacy of the kind which we 
are now treating of: your Conclusion is not in reality that which was, by your own 
account, proposed to be proved. The fallaciousness depends upon the deceit, or attempt to 
deceive’ (reference). The position so outlined thus contains both elements of the technical 
aspects of the tu quoque and, particularly in the light of the last remarks, elements of the 
goody-two shoes model. In what follows I will presuppose these elements. 
 
 I propose the following formulation of the tu quoque arguments of interest: 
 
(1) S asserts P in context C1 and S accepts not-P in context C2 
(2) S fails to satisfactorily explain away the inconsistency described in (1) 
(3) S’s failure to satisfactorily explain away the inconsistency in (1) itself cannot be 
explained 
(4) If S’s failure to satisfactorily explain away the inconsistency in (1) itself cannot be 
explained then P cannot be accepted based on S’s C1 assertion 
___________________________________________________________ 
(C) P cannot be accepted based on S’s C1 assertion     
 
Note first the use of ‘asserts’ in the first conjunct of (1); this gives plausible generic 
expression in discussing dialogical contexts of making public one’s commitment to a 
proposition. Second, I use ‘accepts’ in the second conjunct to cover all relevant cases. 
Although S may have previously explicitly asserted not-P, he may not have either; and so 
the more general ‘accepts’ covers cases based on inferences from S’s past P-relevant 
assertions, or her general P-relevant position, or something P-relevant she has done. 
Third, to forestall a possible objection I note that the contexts C1 and C2 may largely, if 
not fully, overlap, to cover the common situation in which a person accuses another of 
contradicting himself in the course of the same discussion. 
 
 Lines (1) and (2) of this schema are uncontroversial and describe the conditions 
plainly needed to fully launch the tu quoque, in the remaining lines. Obviously there can 
be situations in which my interlocutor notes my inconsistency, and sometimes this can be 
resolved, for there can be many failings of a largely psychological nature that explain the 
inconsistency – perhaps, for example, I have just forgotten the view I held last year. The 
interesting case is captured by (3), for it is at this point that, having exhausted the range of 
innocent mistakes, there simply is no explanation left for an audience to make, but that 
the speaker is epistemically incompetent to make the claims being made.8 
  
 The possibility of schematizing the tu quoque to yield a valid form means the 
significant question of evaluation turns on the soundness of the tu quoque retort. If one 
accepts that some tu quoque arguments ought to succeed, and some not, one is interested 
in the actual circumstances giving rise to this potential success, or in other words, whether 
or not the premises of the argument are in fact true. Yet before applying this evaluation 
test one needs first to decide whether some putative case of tu quoque fits the standard 
form above. It seems there are cases that do not. Consider, for instance, exchanges in 
which the activity of settling a substantive issue between two discussants gets left behind 
 as a result of some other distracting kind of activity. Thus, there are altercations of this 
kind:   
 
So what if I focus on your bad language, I seem to recall you insulting me just a 
minute ago. 
 
These are sometimes labelled tu quoque because one protagonist draws attention to the 
error of another who, she enjoins, has committed the same error. But under the conception 
I am concerned with here the error has to be rationally relevant to an issue the 
protagonists began with. In the case above this condition is not met and on closer 
inspection the ‘debate’ has simply lost its way. Of this broader conception Walton (1998, 
p. 17) says ‘The tu quoque argument, or “you too” argument … can be described as the 
use of any type of argument to reply in like kind to a speaker’s argument’, pointing out 
that in some cases retorts of this nature are not, upon close analysis, genuine ad hominem 
arguments at all. The cases I need to test, then, have to at least reach a threshold whereby 
they can be modelled on the form set out above. If this evaluation test is right, 
determining the rational success of the argument is a matter of checking the plausibility or 
truth of the premises. 
 
 The tu quoque arguments of interest work in two stages. From an opponent’s 
inconsistency with respect to P I infer a lack of credibility as a trustworthy source of 
information (or commitment to some principle if the context is practical reasoning). From 
this lack of credibility I derive a reason not to accept P from this opponent. It is important 
in this formulation that one’s opponent displays inconsistency with respect to P, for it is P 
that is ultimately the issue, and one’s opponent is being called on their epistemic 
credentials in relation to P (or, again, commitment to some practical conclusion). In the 
broader interpretation of tu quoque discussed above, this focus is lost, and with it a 
necessary condition of deserved success. Some other kinds of argumentation – for 
example, abusive ad hominem – may also require description in strategic terms, yet 
abusive ad hominem should fail without exception because the failure of rational 
relevance to an issue in such cases is total.9  
 
 There are circumstances where tu quoque arguments may potentially miss their target 
because, on closer inspection, no real contradiction or hypocrisy is present. Daniel 
Bonevac (1990, p. 51) points out that there may often be a good explanation for one’s 
apparent hypocrisy: perhaps one lacks, or lacked in the past, the strength of will to live up 
to one’s claims. Imagine someone still in the grip of an addiction yet with enough insight 
left to advance an argument against the kind of behaviour that led to that addiction.10 Tu 
quoque retorts here are out of order because the person advancing the argument is more 
plausibly thought to be weak of will, not hypocritical. Their authority on the subject is not 
undermined by their loss of self control, but rather, ironically in this case, enhances it. 
 
 Or consider a case of apparent hypocrisy which turns out on closer inspection to be 
self-deception.11 Imagine an anti-pornography campaigner who, from time to time, views 
pornographic material. Suppose an opponent of this campaigner, discovering this fact, 
claims this hypocritical behaviour undermines his campaign. He responds by claiming 
that his viewing of pornography is motivated by the need for someone to keep watch over 
the pornographers. Now maybe our campaigner genuinely believes this, and interprets his 
responses to the viewing, not as pleasurable, but as more evidence of what he claims is 
the degrading nature of this material. Perhaps so, but this person may have become 
mistaken about an aspect of his motivation; in which case it seems not unreasonable to 
best interpret the case so described as one of self deception and so the tu quoque response 
 to our campaigner now looks off target; although, it might helpfully prompt our 
campaigner to properly analyse his response to the material he views. 
 
 Returning now to an earlier theme, because of the focus tu quoque arguments place on 
an arguer they can be seen to have special bite where an argument relies for its warrant on 
the authority of that arguer. And what I earlier called an argument with authority derives 
its warrant precisely from the person putting it forward. Whereas ad hominem arguments 
work by claiming something objectionable about the person under attack, these arguments 
appeal to the merits of the very person asserting the case. Given the kind of success 
condition this brings into the dialogical space, it is just the kind of argument we should 
regard as vulnerable to an attack by tu quoque. In the next section I describe this kind of 
argument. 
 
Authority 
 
Authority arguments are typically deployed when expert or trustworthy sources are cited 
to support some claim. In cases where expertise is called for these arguments authorise a 
conclusion a protagonist is perhaps otherwise unable to draw because of some epistemic 
limitation. They are extremely common given the rates at which people cite expert 
testimony in support of all manner of conclusion, from scientific claims, to claims about 
the law, or the economy, to everyday claims about (say) the weather, or what time the 
train is due.12 
 
 It is common for authority arguments to appeal to what some expert has claimed, 
where this expert is someone other than the person making the argument. I distinguish 
these cases from cases where the arguer is the expert. In such cases an appeal is made 
with authority. So, for example, one’s general practitioner says ‘Yes I realise you think 
you are fit enough to return to work, but as your doctor I am advising that if you return to 
work the strain will almost certainly cause a relapse’. Or one’s counsel says, ‘I have years 
of practice as a lawyer, so I know what I am talking about in advising against pursuing 
this debt through the courts’. In these cases the arguments for not returning to work, and 
not going to court, gain support from the very people advancing them. 
 
 The difference between appeals from, or with authority, makes a difference to their 
respective susceptibility to tu quoque attacks in dialogical contexts. If I cite the evidence 
of an expert who is someone other than me, an attack on that expert showing them to be 
inconsistent may indeed undermine my evidence; but this is no attack on me qua expert, 
and so does not count as a tu quoque against me.13 The interest here is in the relation 
between authority arguments and the way tu quoque targets them; so the focus is on 
arguments with authority. 
 
 Arguments with authority also arise when the person presenting the case is a figure 
whose position or office gives them the right over another, perhaps to control, direct or 
rule them in some fashion. These administrative-type authority arguments, as Walton 
(1997, p. 77) labels them, sometimes deserve to succeed. To the question ‘why can’t I 
play near the road?’, the answer ‘because we, your parents, say so’ constitutes an 
authority argument with the suppressed premise that the instruction contained within the 
conclusion is made legitimate purely in virtue of the authoritative role embodied by the 
person advancing it. At other times these arguments deserve to fail, namely when one’s 
authority is being misused, or the authoritative role is misplaced in some way, or the 
jurisdiction is wrong. In that case tu quoque responses may be in order. 
 
  Authority arguments have a range of success conditions. The context must be one in 
which an authoritative opinion is legitimate. Experts must be knowledgeable, reliable, 
well-motivated or disinterested, and they must be rightful authorities in the broadest sense 
– e.g. it is no good citing the evidence of a dentist in an argument about climate change, 
and it usually seems out of order for an adult to exercise parental-style control over a 
friend’s child. The expert must properly represent his or her stated area of knowledge, or 
it should be said that alternative views abound. For example, in environmental 
discussions it has become relatively commonplace for mainstream press to cite the work 
of so-called experts whose views are the antithesis of the field. 
 
 Given these requirements, a tu quoque argument may give an audience reason to 
doubt that one or more of the success conditions are satisfied. Where an expert’s 
credentials are bound up with the capacity to have thought through their position with 
consistency, both of belief and motivation, tu quoque attacks should get especially good 
purchase. After all, if the persuasive force of an authority argument relies largely on the 
expertise brought to the table, finding ways to question the expertise would seem 
especially apt as a way to question that argument. 
 
 Consider, then, a case from Australia a few years ago. A marketing executive was 
interviewed on television to provide the expert marketing perspective on the question of 
whether teenage smoking rates may be affected by advertising. The interviewer set a trap. 
During the first ten minutes the executive was asked questions which invited self 
promotion and discussion of the very effective techniques advertising possesses, and of 
the lucrative contracts advertising firms may secure based on the successes of these 
techniques. The executive knowledgably elaborated the ways in which advertising 
effectively changes behaviour. During the middle part of the interview a series of neutral 
questions were asked, and then near the end he was asked whether advertisers share at 
least some of the blame for the rise in teenage smoking rates. At this point he denied there 
was any real link between the advertising techniques in question and the increase in 
smoking rates. The interviewer then pointed out the apparent contradiction, given the 
earlier answers. 
 
 The example depicts a way in which the target argument is countered by showing that 
its proponent cannot have it both ways. The audience is thus owed an explanation at this 
point: does he accept the grounds of this argument that no link obtains between 
advertising and smoking, or not? The audience is entitled to a decision from him: either 
these marketing techniques cause teenage smoking rates to go up or they do not. If the 
techniques do not have the effects claimed elsewhere, why is that? And at this point, 
while the expert sorts out his position, the audience is entitled to suspend their support for 
the authority vested in the argument from the start. 
 
 Authority arguments succeed partly on the basis that the audience to which they are 
addressed has limited choices or time in which to consult alternative sources of evidence. 
What they need to accept is that the source of the argument knows what they are talking 
about. Now sometimes this is quite appropriate, and these days specialisation, 
academically and technically, has led to an almost inevitable reliance on appeals to 
experts. Nevertheless, that fact makes it all the more important to take special care. Locke 
(1690/1984, p. 441) lamented the dangers posed by the lazy tendency to ‘assent to the 
common received opinions’. He was talking about our tendency to unquestioningly rely 
on orthodox opinion. He was worried about our disposition to accede to authority and the 
practice of some to misuse appeals to authority as a way of trading on that disposition.14 
 
  In the light of these considerations a strategy like tu quoque looks apt. Consider that 
in the case above the audience is able to determine from the nature of the evidence being 
presented that the so-called authority on the subject has not, at least with respect to the 
topic at hand, thought through the subject matter.15 Tu quoque attacks can often, then, not 
only entitle the audience to suspend trust in the expert, but also invite legitimate scrutiny 
into his motives. When tu quoque leads to a suspicion about motives, it thereby invites 
further scrutiny into the circumstances of the authority. In this respect, tu quoque counts 
as a first line strategy of significant power, and that is because exhibitions of 
inconsistency are serious, they demand our attention. 
  
Tu quoque and hypocrisy 
 
A quite specific kind of argumentative exchange involves arguments with authority and 
hypocrisy. Political leaders and commentators, academics, clergy, business executives, 
military professionals, moral crusaders and many others are all disposed to advancing 
arguments where they know their own position of authority works in their support. As we 
saw, tu quoque challenges to such arguments can be particularly effective, and the high 
ground can quickly be lost. As they say ‘the bigger they are, the harder they fall’. Let’s 
now focus on cases where this type of authority is accused of being hypocritical. 
 
 We won’t attempt to give a full account and defence of the notion of hypocrisy 
particularly as that concept turns out to be surprisingly complex and slippery.16 Rather, 
the present inquiry calls for the following conception: persons exhibit hypocrisy, making 
them an apt target for a tu quoque attack just when: (1) they express disapproval about 
some practice they themselves engage in, or (2) they express approval of some practice to 
which they themselves do not adhere. The interesting issue is to spell out the conditions 
under which it is appropriate to accuse someone of making hypocritical claims, and by 
‘appropriate’ I mean, first, that the claimant deserves to be unmasked, and second, that in 
unmasking the claimant one is able to neutralise the force of their argument.  
 
  Tu quoque arguments are particularly effective when your interlocutor professes some 
special expert knowledge, or perhaps moral authority on some subject matter, and yet 
they fail to comply with the prescriptive content of their own judgement. A nice example 
of this is provided by Crisp and Cowton (1994, p. 344). The hypocrisy of blame, they say, 
‘… is well illustrated by one view of Senator McCarthy, who – it is said – publicly 
castigated gays for immorality when he was himself gay.’ In these cases the tu quoque 
response against the senator may well have been appropriate (if indeed he was gay). 
However, to be sure, such attacks have to be handled with care for where the hypocrisy is 
merely apparent, deploying the tu quoque response is misguided, as we saw with the 
sincere, weak-willed, drug addict. 
 
 Care should also be taken in cases where an accused person turns out on analysis not 
to be a hypocrite in any sense at all. Consider in this connection the parent who upbraids 
her young teenager for drinking alcohol, a case of someone expressing disapproval of a 
practice she herself engages in. The tu quoque response in this instance – ‘But Mother, 
you drink alcohol’ – does not deserve to succeed, and the reason is that the parent has no 
inconsistency to explain away once it is clear what proposition is under dispute. To see 
this consider again the first line of our tu quoque schema: 
  
 (1) S asserts P in context C1 and S accepts not-P in context C2 
 
What is ‘P’ in this case? Plausibly it is ‘teenagers, (including, therefore, my teenager) 
should not consume alcohol’, in which case, it is just false that the mother believes the 
second conjunct of (1), the denial of this in context C2, and so the first premise is false 
and the tu quoque argument is unsound. The proposition that ought to be under dispute is 
whether teenagers may consume alcohol, and then whether, if they may not, parents are 
permitted to enforce such a ban. Our teenager here, in making this tu quoque argument, 
seemed to be presupposing that the proposition under dispute was whether people in 
general may consume alcohol. Once we are clear about ‘P’ from the start the evaluation 
of the tu quoque can proceed. 
 
 In the theoretical context tu quoque is effective because it exploits a principle along 
the lines that if this expert does not (really) accept what they are saying, then why should 
we? In the practical domain tu quoque might be effective for another quite interesting 
reason if we plug in an Aristotelian assumption about the way to understand the 
conclusion of a practical syllogism. Famously Aristotle claimed such conclusions should 
be understood as actions. He wrote: 
 
But there [the theoretical case] the end is a theoretical proposition. For whenever one 
thinks of the two premises, one thinks and puts together the conclusion. Here, instead, 
[in the practical case], the two premises generate the conclusion, which is conduct (de 
motu an. 701a 10-13).17 
 
The significance of using this assumption as part of a tu quoque argument is to bring out a 
problem in an opponent’s position akin to the way one brings out a problem when using a 
reductio against an opponent. In a reductio you show that your opponent’s position leads 
to a contradiction, rendering it absurd. Likewise, if we take the McCarthy example, the tu 
quoque strategy seems to show that his will contains a contradiction, and so his 
prescription against homosexual behaviour is also absurd. 
 
 In a practical context pointing out to your opponent that his evidence is inconsistent 
has the effect that he may not generate the conclusion (= conduct) he had hoped this 
evidence might support, and so the effectiveness of tu quoque here resides in removing an 
opponent’s motivation. A particularly famous New Testament case of this is that of the 
woman caught in the act of adultery brought to Jesus by the scribes and Pharisees. Old 
Testament law requires the woman be stoned, and so they test whether Jesus is prepared 
to apply the law or act more liberally. St John continues the story: 
 
But Jesus stooped down, and with His finger wrote on the ground, as though He heard 
them not. So when they continued asking Him, He lifted up Himself, and said unto 
them, He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her. And again He 
stooped down, and wrote on the ground. And they which heard it, being convicted by 
their own conscience, went out one by one, beginning at the eldest, even unto the last: 
and Jesus was left alone, and the woman standing in the midst (John 8: 6-9 KJV). 
 
This example is particularly instructive. For one thing it brings out the Aristotelian point 
regarding action as constituting the conclusion of the syllogism Jesus invites the scribes 
and Pharisees to make. No sooner are they ‘convicted by their own conscience’ than they 
leave. (I take it we are to assume some degree of parity of sin.) The example shows nicely 
the reason-giving nature of tu quoque in a context where it chains with practical reason, 
 and in this case moral reason. Faced with the application of a principle where we 
ourselves become knowingly subject to its prescription we come properly to see its force. 
 
 Finally this tu quoque example also contains elements of the Golden Rule. For the 
scribes and Pharisees are in effect asked by Jesus not to treat the accused woman in a way 
they themselves would not want to be treated. And indeed some formulations of the 
Golden Rule can be read simply as injunctions against hypocrisy. Consider, for example, 
Thales’ version to ‘avoid doing what you would blame others for doing’.18 This version is 
particularly apt in cases like the one above involving Senator McCarthy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Tu quoque arguments work best when the audience to one’s argument (including 
especially one’s opponent) recognises that to continue to present this opposing position is 
possible only on pain of a failure to respond to the apparent inconsistency in one’s 
reasons for it, or the hypocrisy inherent in one’s advocacy of a certain practice. An honest 
recognition of this sort can then force a choice in the right direction to retract one’s view, 
repair one’s position, to dissolve the inconsistency, or perhaps even to simply walk away, 
as we just saw. When the strategy of tu quoque is used to undermine an authority 
argument its force is increased commensurate with the deflationary effect on the 
authoritative warrant invested in the target.  
 
 As well as exploring these ideas I have emphasised the normative importance of 
cooperation in the discussion because ad hominem arguments within many dialogue 
contexts are notorious for bringing discussion to an inappropriate end rather than 
shedding light on its subject. Nevertheless, it only requires a minimal presumption of 
rationality for this normativity to be internalised by the participants, one of whom is 
accused of a contradiction. The success of the argument on the other side depends on 
whether the inconsistent discussant is able to dissolve it, and who would not want to do 
that? It seems likely that those running arguments with authority, having even more at 
stake, are less disposed to cooperation when their authority and expertise are called into 
question. An important function of the tu quoque against them is to separate the misuse of 
their alleged expert knowledge from the real thing. 
 
Notes 
 
1  The conception of the tu quoque I am interested in has been discussed by Bonevac (1990) and 
Pirie (2006). 
2  To put it another way, some may think it genuinely unorthodox in relation to argumentum ad 
hominem, but as Walton (1998) has noticed, it is a bit difficult these days to see just what 
counts as the orthodoxy. 
3  For instance, the decline, over two decades, of principled and quality journalism in the US, 
UK, and Australia – the media I am familiar with – is not really disputed, but I won’t attempt 
to prove it here. 
4  Henry Johnstone (1952) is regarded as the writer who resurrected interest in this approach by 
revisiting the traditional conception of the ad hominem described by Richard Whately (1836). 
5  Grice did not use the expression ‘goody-two shoes’, Gabbay and Woods (2001) do; they do 
note the Gricean connection. Grice’s conversational maxims – be appropriately informative, 
truthful, relevant and perspicuous – fall out of an overarching cooperative principle requiring 
conversational contributors to pay heed to the purpose and conventions of a dialogue by 
conforming what is said to the maxims (Grice (1989, pp. 26-7). Should the Goody-two shoes 
  
assumption hold in all dialogical contexts? Almost certainly not, and it is an important open 
question where and when it should hold. Gabbay and Woods (2001, p. 180) argue that if the 
Goody two shoes model held generally ‘… there would be strategies about which nothing 
good could be said’. They note also the model should be a ‘… strict requirement of dialogues 
of certain types, for example, a disagreement about the dangers of genetic mutation of 
foodstuffs’. Agreed, but Gabbay and Woods, it seems have an overly narrow conception of 
the range of contexts to which cooperation ought to apply. For example, should non-
cooperation always apply in the cross-examination of a witness in a criminal trial? Gabbay 
and Woods (2001, p. 164) seem to think so, but for this and many other places, it seems a 
pretty open question. The right approach to deciding these requirements would seem to be one 
that views dialogue logic against the constraints of ethical theory. 
6  Thus I take the discussion here to feel most at home, and in sympathy with, the dialectical 
program in Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1992), particularly with regard to an 
approach in argumentation as of centering ‘… around resolving differences by means of 
argumentative discourse’ (see p.13). For a detailed account and critique of this and other 
dialectical approaches see Maurice A. Finocchiaro (2005), particularly the later chapters of 
Part III. 
7  For an extensive discussion of the use of ad hominem by Galileo (in fact ad hominem as used 
against Aristotle) see Finocchiaro (2005, pp. 331-339). Walton (1998, p. 22) discusses a 
distinction made by Schopenhauer between arguing against an opponent’s commitment, and a 
personal attack argument. De Morgan recalls Whately in his discussion and is circumspect 
regarding permissible use. He says that charges against an opponent on grounds of 
inconsistency may constitute a ‘valid defence’ if the original argument is a personal attack 
(see p. 265).  
8  I am indebted to an anonymous referee for identifying a weakness in an earlier schematic 
form of this argument, and for prompting me to see the necessity for line (3). 
9  Cf. Eerik Lagerspetz (1995, p. 368). Assume here that ‘abusive’ is defined so as not to allow 
for the inclusion of attributions of motive. In such a case ‘abusive ad hominem’ potentially 
collapses into a form of circumstantial ad hominem. See Walton (1987, pp. 327-28). 
10  Yul Brynner is a famous instance of this kind of thing. He died in 1985 of lung cancer, and 
before he died he made a commercial, shown after his death, exhorting people not to smoke. 
11  Daniel Statman (1997) has analysed hypocrisy in terms of self-deception. He argues that ‘… 
hypocrisy typically involves or leads to self-deception [because] a consistent and conscious 
deception of society is self-defeating from the point of view of egoistical hypocrites’. See p. 
57. 
12  Though perhaps this last example counts only if one relies on the experience of an official, 
and even then this may be a doubtful case. I will put aside cases of simply seeking information 
from ‘someone or other’. But in addition, as Birrer (2001, p. 267) notes, ‘… there is reason to 
distinguish between two types of dialogue: one of straightforward information seeking 
dialogue, where the information seeker is able to more or less fully specify the information 
needed; and one of expert advice seeking dialogue, where the advice seeking person is not 
able to do so’. 
13  Noting the inconsistent position of the expert I cite is also not yet a non fallacious tu quoque 
strategy against this expert, unless further evidence is forthcoming that this expert does not, or 
could not, account for this tension, or until this expert has had a chance to provide reasons 
explaining it away. My opponent is in dialogue with me here, not my authority source. 
Fairness requires us to say my authority source has been challenged, but not refuted. 
14  Cf. Douglas Walton (1989, p. 172). 
15  Another possible (plausible?) explanation is that the executive lied, or at least, exhibited gross 
bad faith. If this was the case, then there is a good explanation for the inconsistency, and the 
  
strategy of tu quoque fails, since no incompetence is revealed. The inference from the lie 
would be that the executive believes advertising does cause teenage smoking rates to rise, a 
claim that is compatible with the executive’s earlier bragging. Again, I thank an anonymous 
referee for identifying this complexity in the case.  
16  There is a small and interesting literature on hypocrisy. See, for example, Roger Crisp and 
Christopher Cowton (1994), Saul Smilansky (1994), Daniel Statman (1997), Bela Szabados 
and Eldon Soifer (2004), and Dan Turner (1990). 
17  See also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1147a, 25-28. 
18  See Diogenes Laërtius I, 36 
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